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Structured  Abstract  
 
Purpose – The paper considers how the Federal crop insurance program influences farm debt use, one of the key 
financial decisions made by farm operators.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – Using data from the nationally-representative Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey, the paper implements a propensity score matching model of the impact of Federal crop insurance 
participation on various measures of farm business debt use. To account for the simultaneity of financial decisions, 
the paper further tests this relationship using a seemingly unrelated regression model. 
 
Findings – Federal crop insurance participation is associated with an increase in use of short term farm debt, but not 
long term debt, consistent with risk balancing behavior and current trends in the farm sector.  
 
Research limitations/implications –In addition to risk balancing, the results are also consistent with credit constraints 
or lender preferences. The paper cannot fully establish causality between crop insurance participation and short term 
debt levels. Future research should address these limitations.  
 
Practical implications – Agricultural lending standards are generally conservative and the farm sector as a whole 
currently has historically low leverage, which implies that an increase in debt use may not be a threat to the financial 
health of the farm sector. 
 
Social implications – The results indicate that the reduction in total risk facing the farm sector is significantly less than 
the decline in risk provided by Federal crop insurance, which is an important consideration for policymakers. 
 
Originality/value – This is the first paper to use an econometric model to analyse the relationship between federal 
crop insurance and farm debt use decisions. This paper can inform future research on the Federal crop insurance 
program and farm financial decisions.  
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Does Federal Crop Insurance lead to higher farm debt use? Evidence from the 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) 
Federal crop insurance (FCI) has become a key component of US farm policy. In farm bill 
negotiations in 2012 and 2013, crop insurance emerged as the preferred form of farm financial 
support for many farm sector participants. The Agricultural Act of 2014 (“new farm bill”) 
cemented FCI as a pillar of US farm policy. Like other farm programs, FCI carries the potential to 
influence the behavior of market participants in various ways, and the change in behavior has 
important implications for the ability of farm policy to meet its stated goals, as well as potential 
adverse impacts. A vast literature has considered market responses to FCI and related programs, 
including adverse selection and moral hazard (Just et al., 1999), land uses decisions (Claassen et 
al., 2011; Turvey, 2012), farm structure (O’Donoghue, Roberts, and Key, 2009) and land values 
(Ifft, Wu, and Kuethe, 2014). FCI participation could also affect financial decisions, as it impacts 
both total farm income and income variability. Theoretical and empirical research on risk 
balancing has shown that farm operations might increase financial risk in response to a decline in 
business risk, but there is limited empirical research on the relationship between current 
government programs that decrease business risk and farm financial risk levels. In this article we 
consider how the FCI program might be influencing farm debt use, one of the key financial 
decisions made by farm operators.  
Farm Policy and Federal Crop Insurance 
FCI is administered as a “public-private partnership”, where private companies offer a 
variety of insurance policies. Indemnity risk is shared by the government and insurance companies, 
and subsides are provided for administration of the program and a share of the premium based on 
total coverage. A total of almost 296 million acres were enrolled in a FCI program in 2013, with 
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well over half of all acreage of most major agricultural commodities being enrolled. Premium 
subsides were $7.3 billion in 2013, about 62% of the total premium. This share has been relatively 
constant over the past decade (Risk Management Agency, 2014). One of the roles of the subsidies 
is to ensure sufficient enrollment, which can serve to lower total costs if risk can be spread across 
a large insurance pool. Total (net) government costs for the program have been estimated to 
approximately $4 billion per year from 2001 to 2012, and in addition the premium subsidies and 
other costs, the government can incur underwriting loss or gains (Barnaby, 2013). For a more 
detailed review of the FCI program, see Glauber (2013).  
The growth of crop insurance has coincided with a decline in the importance of other farm 
programs. Over the past decade, payments linked to market prices averaged about 22% of total 
farm program payments, and countercyclical payments and loan deficiency payments were less 
than one percent of farm program payments in 2012 and 2013 (Economic Research Service, 2014). 
In the Agricultural Act of 2014, FCI was strengthened and direct payments were eliminated for 
almost all commodities. The Price Loss Coverage (PLC), Agricultural Risk Coverage, and 
Supplemental Loss Coverage (SLC) programs were all authorized and will be paid out based on 
market prices and/or yields.  
Direct payments, as well as other programs, have been theorized to facilitate access to 
credit (Westcott and Young, 2004). One study found empirical evidence for this claim, in that that 
farms with a larger share of base acre faced slightly smaller interest rates for short term loans 
(Kropp and Whitaker, 2011). Direct payments in particular may have been considered a reliable 
source of income that could be used to service debt. Direct payments are paid based on historic 
acreage of eligible commodities or a farm’s base acres and remained relatively steady and were 
much smaller relative to revenues and expenses for most field crops in recent years compared to a 
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decade ago. A study by Ifft et al. (2012) found that elimination of direct payments would not lead 
to a substantial decline in the financial position of the majority of farms receiving direct payments. 
Given the declining importance of direct payments and other farm programs over the last decade, 
crop insurance and related programs may have an even larger role in farm financial decisions than 
prior research would suggest. 
Crop insurance and risk balancing 
Crop insurance has been shown to potentially improve the financial health of agricultural 
lenders and farm operations. A study by Lee and Djogo (1984) found that crop insurance could 
reduce loan losses for agricultural lenders. Pfleuger and Barry (1986) found that crop insurance 
participation could improve liquidity and farm survival for a representative highly leveraged farm. 
However, Skees and Nutt (1988) found purchasing crop insurance could be detrimental to highly 
leveraged farms once lower levels of loss ratios are taken into account. These findings, which are 
largely based on simulations, might be less relevant under current FCI program parameters but 
point to important financial implication of the current FCI program. For lenders or producers 
concerned with reducing loan default risk, FCI can be an important risk management tool.  
Risk balancing theory, however, predicts an increase in financial risk or debt use in 
response to both the income and risk reduction aspects of the FCI program. Gabriel and Baker 
(1980) first demonstrated that government policies that decrease business risk for a farm operation 
could induce the operation to take on additional financial risk, limiting the effectiveness of the 
original policy to decrease the total risk faced by the farm sector. Business risks are defined as 
risks that are independent of financing decisions. Farms might also take private actions, such as 
technology adoption, that decrease business risk but allow for additional financial risk. For the 
agricultural sector, most business risks would be related to various sources of price and yield risk. 
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Use of FCI, by design, can decrease both price and yield risk. Financial risks for the farm sector 
largely stem from risks related to debt financing and are formally defined as the change in the 
variability of cash flows due to debt financing and cash leasing. Collins (1985) further formalized 
this concept and also considered the introduction of policies that increase income levels. 
Featherstone et al (1988) use a mean variance model to determine the leverage response to risk 
reducing or income augmenting polices. Using a theoretical model, they found that farm policies 
can cause a large enough increase in leverage that the probability of negative returns to equity also 
increases.  
Several studies have since extended these theoretical papers, but here we will briefly 
summarize a few key empirical findings. Various studies have shown evidence of risk balancing 
in the farm sector, although few if any have considered the impact of government programs, which 
can lower business risk, on financial risk. Moss (1990) found that an increase in expected farm 
sector returns or a decrease in expected variance of returns could lead to an increase aggregate 
debt, which indicates that the farm sector debt use responds to business risk in a manner consistent 
risk balancing.  Jensen and Langemeier (1996) found that the variance in real operating profit, a 
key measure of business risk, can affect leverage. Escalante and Barry (2003) found evidence of 
risk balancing in over half of 80 Illinois farms, using longitudinal data from 1982 to 1998. Turvey 
and Kong (2009) found that Chinese farm households exhibited behavior consistent with risk 
balancing. de Mey et al (2014) recently found evidence of farm-level risk balancing in the EU 
using farm survey panel data for 15 countries from 1995-2008. Ifft et al. (2013) suggested that 
federal crop insurance now plays an increasingly important role in the farm safety net and found 
that farms that participate in federal crop insurance have a higher credit default risk. However, this 
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result is only suggestive as farm characteristics that could impact both debt use decisions and FCI 
participation are not controlled for.  
Methodology 
Ideally, from the researcher’s perspective, farm operations could be randomly assigned 
crop insurance coverage as a part of a controlled experiment. Treatment effects, or the impact of 
crop insurance on debt use, could then be identified by observing differences in an outcome 
variable between identical pairs of subjects assigned to “treatment” and “control” groups. Outside 
of a controlled experiment, however, treatment effects are difficult to observe because treatment 
and control groups are not independently assigned. Further, the same factors that determine 
whether a subject receives treatment or not may impact differences in the outcome variable. Like 
many farm programs, FCI has been implemented at the national level and participation is available 
to virtually all farms and is voluntary.  
In our case, a farmer likely decides whether to purchase crop insurance based on the same 
factors that determine the farm’s debt level. To take into account the simultaneity of these 
decisions, we use two approaches to test the relationship between debt use and FCI participation. 
We first use propensity score matching to estimate the difference in debt use between farm 
operations with and without FCI coverage. We then use a seemingly unrelated regression to 
explicitly model joint determination of farm debt structure, or different measures of financial risk, 
and crop insurance participation.  
Propensity Score Matching 
Propensity score matching (PSM) was developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to 
simulate a controlled experiment framework for non-randomly assigned groups. PSM is derived 
from the equation 
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𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0|𝐷 = 1)      (1) 
where Y is the outcome variable and D is a binary variable that indicates whether the observation 
belongs to the treatment (D = 1) or control (D = 0) group. An observation can be in only one state, 
so the matching procedure attempts to estimate the unobservable counterfactual E(Y0 | D = 1). In 
our case, the unobserved counterfactual is the impact of not purchasing crop insurance on farm 
debt levels for farms that that actually purchase crop insurance.  
The control group in our study is farms that did not purchase crop insurance. Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that if treatment is determined by some set of covariates X, a control 
can be identified that is similar in X relative to the treatment group. Formally, this relationship is 
defined as: 
𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝑋, 𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑋, 𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑋, 𝐷 = 1)     (2) 
The matching estimator pairs treated observations with one or more observationally similar 
non-treated observations, and pairings are based on the similarities of the covariates. The 
procedure yields accurate treatment effects when the outcomes are independent of the selection 
process after conditioning on the covariates. The conditional mean independence implies that: 
𝐸(𝑌0|𝑋, 𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑋, 𝐷 = 0)        (3) 
The matching procedure, however, can be difficult to implement directly when a large 
number of covariates are required, and conditional mean independence typically requires a large 
set of covariates. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest that, instead of conditioning on all the 
elements of X, one may condition on a one-dimensional function of the covariates. This one-
dimensional function – the propensity score – can be estimated through discrete choice methods. 
The propensity score implies that if Y0 is independent of selection when conditioned on X, then it 
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is also independent of selection when conditioned on the probability of selection on X. This is 
formally defined as: 
𝑃(𝑋) = 𝑃(𝐷 = 1|𝑋)          (4) 
While originally developed for the natural sciences, PSM methods have grown in 
popularity in agricultural and applied economics. Recent examples include the treatment effect of 
risk management tool adoption on farm-level profit (Kuethe and Morehart, 2012a), contracting on 
prices received (Katchova, 2010), credit constraints on productivity (Briggeman, et al., 2009), 
farmland preservation on farmland conversion (Lynch and Liu, 2007), and food aid programs on 
food consumption (Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2007).  
PSM requires that no single covariate or combination of covariates can guarantee 
treatment. More formally, for a set of covariates X, the probability of treatment is strictly greater 
than 0 and strictly less than 1 (
𝐷 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥 < 1∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑋
0 < 𝑃
). This condition must hold for each treated 
observation to have the potential of an analogue among the untreated observations. The impact of 
being treated is only valid for observations within the common support. Alternatively, the 
propensity scores for treated and untreated observations are positive and the distributions of 
propensity scores intersect. Propensity score matching also relies on the “selection on the 
observables” assumption, or the assumption that farm operations that have been matched based on 
observable characteristics are the same in relation to all relevant factors that influence both debt 
use and federal crop insurance participation. While this assumption has been shown to hold in 
some studies (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002), in others it does not, and ultimately causality cannot 
always be definitely established (Smith and Todd, 2005). While we cannot implement a controlled 
experiment to validate our results, we are able to match farm operations on a large set of 
characteristics. One major factor for PSM to be consistent with the results of a controlled 
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experiment is the size and detail of the dataset being used. In this study will take advantage of a 
large, nationally-representative farm survey.  
The first step of PSM is to estimate each producer’s propensity for purchasing Federal crop 
insurance. The purchase decision, as it relates to farm characteristics, can be expressed: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 1) = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀         (5) 
where Prob(Y = 1) is the probability that the operation receives treatment, X a set of observable 
farm and operator characteristics, β a set of unknown parameters relating the observable 
characteristics to the probability of treatment, and ε the residual. Equation (5) is estimated through 
a logit model using the delete-a-group jackknife (Kott, 1998). 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) allows us to jointly estimate a more comprehensive 
set of measures of financial risk and crop insurance participation. This approach was used by 
Escalante et al (2009) in an analysis of the sustainable growth challenge model that jointly 
estimated several financial determinants of growth. While SUR admits a less flexible functional 
form than PSM, it allows for joint modeling of crop insurance and multiple debt use decisions that 
are closer to actual farm-level debt structure decisions. Given that farms make multiple decisions 
about debt structure, it is likely that joint estimation will account for the relationship between these 
decisions better than PSM. To implement the SUR model, we assume that each measure of 
financial risk or debt use decision 𝐷, denoted by subscript 𝑗, is a linear function of the insurance 
participation decision by farm 𝑖, (𝑌𝑖𝑗), as well as the same explanatory variables (𝑋𝑖𝑗) used to 
measure insurance participation as in the PSM model: 
𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗         (6) 
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The SUR model assumes non-zero covariance for the errors terms 𝜀𝑖𝑗  across all 𝑗, 𝑘 
equations, or debt use decisions, for farm observation 𝑖, or 𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑗, 𝜀𝑖𝑘) = 𝜎𝑖𝑗 . The model also assumes 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑗 , 𝜀𝑖𝑘
′ ) = 0 if 𝑖 ≠ 𝑖′for all 𝑗, 𝑘 debt use decisions. The feasible generalized least-squares 
algorithm that addresses heteroscedastic disturbances described in Greene (2003) is used to 
estimate the model. We estimate one SUR model with three measures of absolute debt levels: real 
estate debt, non-real estate long term debt, and short term debt. The other model estimates three 
ratios or measures of relative of debt use, specifically debt-to-asset ratio, current ratio, and the ratio 
of total operating debt to total operating expenses. Standard errors are calculated using a cluster 
bootstrap, with clusters drawn at the strata level, following the recommendations of Weber and 
Clay (2013). This approach allows us to estimate the standard errors implied by SUR while still 
accounting for ARMS survey design.  
Data  
We examine the relationship between federal crop insurance and farm debt use using recent 
data from the 2011 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS). ARMS is an annual 
survey of farm and ranch operators conducted by the USDA to obtain information about the status 
of farmer’s finances and resource use (Kuethe and Morehart, 2012b). Our analysis is limited to 
farm businesses, defined in this study using the same official USDA definition used by Ifft, Kuethe 
and Morehart (2013), which includes (1) farms where the principal operator’s primary occupation 
is farming (removing all “limited-resource,” “retirement,” and “residential/lifestyle” farms), (2) 
farms with sales over $250,000 and/or (3) non-family farms. ARMS stratified sample design 
requires weighted estimation of sample statistics, and we use the standard delete-a-group jackknife 
procedure of Kott (1998) for our PSM model. 
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We define treatment as the purchase of at least some amount of federal crop insurance, and 
our analysis suggests that approximately 30% of farm businesses meet this definition (Table 1). It 
is important to note, however, that over half of farm businesses (51%) derive the majority of their 
revenue from livestock production (beef cattle, hog, poultry, dairy, and general livestock) and an 
additional 10% derive the majority of their revenue from specialty crops, such as tobacco, fruits 
and tree nuts, vegetables, and nursery and greenhouse (Table 1). 
There is a well-established literature that examines farm and farm operator characteristics 
that influence federal crop insurance purchase decisions. For PSM models, it is recommended that 
covariates are based on economic theory and previous research and also should not be influenced 
by the insurance participation decision (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008), and this approach was 
followed in our selection of covariates. Matching quality or “balancing” of covariates across the 
treatment and control groups is also important for PSM estimation. One approach recommended 
by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) is to use t-tests determine if means of covariates are not 
statistically different after the propensity score is calculated. For our selected covariates, nearly 
half are not statistically different after matching. While ideally all covariates should be balanced, 
in practice there are tradeoffs between balancing covariates and omitting variables that are 
important determinants of the key decision variable (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). For 
comparability across our PSM results and SUR results, we elected to use the same set of covariates 
for each modeling approach based on the literature. While the level of balancing in our PSM 
analysis may be less than ideal, covariates are substantially more balanced after the matching 
procedure and results can be interpreted in a more relevant economic framework. The summary 
statistics for the covariates for estimating the logit model for the propensity to purchase federal 
crop insurance and the explanatory variables for the SUR Model (𝑋𝑖𝑗) are provided in Table 1.  
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Previous empirical studies demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between crop 
insurance purchasing decisions and farm acreage (Sherrick, et al., 2004), percent of acreage 
dedicated to cropland production (Coble, et al., 1996), the ratio of owned to total operated acres 
(Valendia, et al., 2009; Mishra and El-Osta, 2002; Sherrick, et al., 2004), off farm income 
(Velandia, et al., 2009), operator age (Sherrick, et al., 2004), and operator education (Sherrick, et 
al., 2004). In addition, Velandia, et al. (2009) and Mishra and El-Osta (2002) show regional 
variation in insurance adoption rates, and as a result, we account for regional differences using 
Economic Research Service (ERS) defined Farm Resource Regions (Heimlich, 2000). In addition, 
we control for differences in farm production specialty (Farm type) and scale (Sales class). 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 Figure 1 shows that farms that purchase at least some level of Federal crop insurance 
coverage are associated with higher debt levels. The average level of debt for farms with Federal 
crop insurance is roughly 225% higher than for farms without and approximately 93% than the 
average for all farms (with and without debt). This pattern is also consistent when observing either 
long-term– non-real estate and real estate debt – and short-term loan debt. Short-term debt – debt 
associated with production loans – can be further divided into debt that remains at the end of 2011 
(outstanding) and short-term debt that includes all debt paid before the end of the calendar year 
(all). Debt relative to assets is 50% higher for farms that purchase Federal crop insurance compared 
to those that do not. In 2011 farms that purchased Federal crop insurance had a debt-to-asset ratio 
of 0.12, while those that did not had a debt-to-asset ratio of 0.08. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 However, it is important to note that the simple summary statistics can be deceiving. Farms 
with certain characteristics, including financial position, may be more likely to purchase crop 
14 
 
insurance, and these same characteristics may also drive decisions related to debt. This 
endogeneity may bias the simple summary statistics and provides motivation for using both PSM 
and SUR approaches to estimate the effect of crop insurance on farm debt levels.  
Results  
 The logit estimates suggest that Federal crop insurance purchases are associated with a 
number of farm and farm operator characteristics (Table 2). Farms with a larger share of cropland 
acres to total acres operated are more likely to purchase Federal crop insurance. In addition, 
farmers with higher levels of education, compared to the base category of “some high school,” are 
more likely to purchase Federal crop insurance. The sales class categorical variables indicate that 
the probability of purchasing Federal crop insurance decreases as the volume of farm sales 
decreases. The categorical variables for farm type also show a significant effect relative to the 
omitted category “general cash grain.” A number of farm types are associated with a lower chance 
of adoption: soybean, general crop, vegetables, nursery and greenhouse, beef cattle, hogs, poultry, 
dairy, and general livestock. Similarly, the regional indicator variables demonstrate regional 
variability in Federal crop insurance uptake relative to the omitted “Heartland” region. Farms in 
the Northern Great Plains were more likely to purchase crop insurance, yet a negative effect was 
found for farms located in the Northern Crescent, Eastern Uplands, Southern Seaboard, Fruitful 
Rim, and Basin and Range regions. The reported residual deviance, an approximation of goodness 
of fit, suggests that the model provides a reasonable fit to the data and, therefore, is a good predictor 
of Federal crop insurance participation (Greene, 2003 Appendix B, Manning, 2007). 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]   
 The treated observations, those who purchase at least some level of Federal crop insurance 
coverage, are then matched to the control group based on the weighted logit propensity scores. The 
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impact of crop insurance on farm debt at the operation level is estimated as the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT). Following Equation (2), ATT is expressed: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝑃(𝑋), 𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑃(𝑋), 𝐷 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌0 ∨ 𝑃(𝑋), 𝐷 = 1)  (7) 
ATT was calculated using an R program that employs nearest neighbor matching, with 
replacement. The estimated ATT for various definitions of farm business debt are reported in Table 
3. The table reports the estimated level of farm debt, its standard error, and a t-test for the difference 
between treatment and control groups. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 The ATT estimates suggest a statistically significant increase in short term debt. The results 
suggest a nearly $64,000 increase in short-term debt outstanding at the end of 2011, but when the 
short term debt paid throughout the calendar year is also included (all), the ATT increases by more 
than $214,000. This is an increase by about 2.6 to 3 times the average farm-level short term debt 
in 2011, respectively. The ATT for the level of total debt relative to total assets (farm debt to asset 
ratio) also suggests a statistically significant increase at 0.03. This effect may be driven by short 
term debt use, as the ATT for the level of total short term debt relative to total operating expenses 
also suggests a strongly statistically significant increase of 0.14. In contrast to the simple summary 
statistics reported in Figure 1, the ATT for total and long-term – real estate and non-real estate – 
farm business debt, as well as the current ratio, are not statistically significant. After farm 
characteristics are taken into account, total long term debt use is not related to crop insurance 
participation. In sum, the relationship between leverage and crop insurance may largely be driven 
by differences in short term debt use. 
 While the SUR results (Table 4) in some cases have a slightly lower level of statistical 
significance than the PSM, they are largely consistent. The differences between our SUR and PSM 
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may be due to different functional forms being used. SUR imposes a linear relationship, which 
may be more restrictive, especially when lending behaviors affected by risk preferences are being 
analyzed. The differences may also be due to SUR being able to take into account the simultaneity 
associated with different debt use decisions. The Breusch-Pagan test statistics reported in Table 4 
indicate that the error terms across the different equations are indeed not independent. Depending 
on actual behavior, taking into account broader measures of debt use may show more or less of a 
relationship with FCI participation.  
The results suggest that FCI participation is associated with an almost $22,000 increase in 
short-term debt outstanding at the end of 2011, and an almost $16,000 increase in non-real estate 
long term debt. These measures are only statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and similar 
to the PSM results, FCI participation does not have a statistically significant impact on real estate 
debt. While FCI participation does not have a statistically significant impact on the current ratio 
and leverage in the SUR model of financial ratios, the impact on the ratio of short term debt to 
operating expenses is remarkably similar to that of the PSM model. FCI participation is associated 
with a 0.13 increase in short term debt relative to operating expenses, and this result is statistically 
significant at the five-percent level.  
 Overall, our results are consistent with risk balancing behavior, but not across all types of 
debt use. Crop insurance covers business risks within a single growing season, and risk balancing 
appears to be occurring for financial risk within the same period as opposed to longer term financial 
risks. One possible explanation for our finding of a nonexistent or weak relationship of FCI 
participation and long-term debt use is our reliance on cross sectional data available through the 
ARMS survey. ARMS is not a longitudinal study, and hence we do not examine the dynamic 
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relationship between insurance adoption and long-term debt use, which is an important topic for 
future research.  
However, the observed relationship between production loans and FCI participation is 
consistent with current trends in the farm sector. Access to short term debt or production loans 
may have been especially important for farm operations over the past decade, as farm expenses 
have increased substantially. In real terms, US farm sector cash expenses increased 127 percent 
from 2002 to 2011 (Economic Research Service, 2014). Production loans have short maturities 
and are typically paid out of current-year revenues, so loan terms at least loosely match the revenue 
(or yield) protection provided by FCI. For producers as well as lenders, FCI would substantially 
lower the default risk for production credit. Further, as expenses have increased over the past 
decade, crop insurance has become an increasingly important relative to other farm programs. 
Together, these trends are consistent with FCI playing a key role in facilitating access to production 
credit in recent years.   
Our results are also consistent with bankers who allow producers to use crop insurance 
policies as collateral for operating loans. Bankers may even require crop insurance for access to a 
line of credit. If this is a key factor in the relationship between debt use and FCI participation, then 
producers may be exhibiting less risk balancing behavior than implied by our results. Alternatively, 
FCI could potentially bring credit use to socially optimal levels if credit constraints are present in 
the farm sector. Credit constraints are associated with an estimated 3 percent decline in value of 
farm production (Briggeman et al., 2009), yet commercial banks have recently reported relatively 
weak loan demand (Henderson and Akers, 2012). These are important topics for future research, 
as they may be a complimentary or competing explanations for risk balancing as a cause of the 
strong relationship between short term debt use and federal crop insurance participation. 
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Conclusion  
 US farms that use federal crop insurance use more short term debt than farms without 
insurance. This behavior is consistent with risk balancing and also is robust to controlling for 
multiple farm characteristics. Propensity score matching and SUR models allows us to consider 
debt levels between similar farms with and without federal crop insurance coverage. Short term 
debt as a share of operating expenses is 0.13-0.14 higher for these farms and use of short term 
loans is also higher. However, higher levels of long term debt are generally not associated with 
FCI participation. These findings may be related to growing use of short term debt to cover 
increasing farm production expenses.  
Different methodologies can be used to characterize the relationship between debt use and 
farm policy, and approaches that further address the simultaneity of crop insurance and debt 
decisions should be considered. Although our paper does not fully establish causality or that debt 
levels are higher than they would have been without FCI, policy shocks or instrumental variable 
approaches could be used in future research. Use of panel data in particular would allow for 
changes in behavior over time to be analyzed, and could elucidate whether or not debt use has been 
increasing in response to availability of FCI or if FCI is being adopted to accommodate increasing 
debt use. The presence of credit constraints and the potential role of crop insurance in alleviating 
credit constraints should be further explored. The role of lender versus farmer preference in the 
relationship between debt use and crop insurance also merits further research. If lenders are driving 
FCI participation, farm operators may not be exhibiting as much risk balancing behavior as implied 
by our results.  
Agricultural lending standards are generally conservative and the farm sector as a whole 
currently has historically low leverage (Ifft et al, 2014). In addition to our result that FCI 
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participation is not related to long term debt use, this implies that the increase in average debt use 
in response to FCI may not be a threat to the financial health of the farm sector. However, if one 
of the goals of the FCI program is to lower the risk that is faced by farm operations, our results 
indicate that the reduction in total risk facing the farm sector is significantly less than the decline 
in risk provided by FCI. The impacts of the FCI program on farm financial decisions are an 
important consideration for policymakers as the debate on US farm policy continues.   
 
References 
Barnaby, A. (2013). “In Most Years, Farmers Write “Big” Crop Insurance Checks”. Ag Manager. 
Available online at 
http://www.agmanager.info/crops/insurance/risk_mgt/rm_pdf13/AB_CropIns_TaxpayerCosts.pdf 
(Accessed October 21, 2013). 
Briggeman, B. C., Towe, C. A., & Morehart, M. J. (2009). “Credit constraints: their existence, 
determinants, and implications for US farm and nonfarm sole proprietorships.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91(1), 275-289. 
Caliendo, M., & Kopeinig, S. (2008). “Some practical guidance for the implementation of 
propensity score matching.” Journal of Economic Surveys, 22(1), 31-72. 
Coble, K.H., T.O. Knight, R.D. Pope, and J.R. Williams (1996) “Modeling farm-level crop 
insurance demand with panel data” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78 (2): 
439-447. 
Claassen, R., F. Carriazo, J.C. Cooper, D. Hellerstein, and K. Ueda. 2011. “Grassland to Cropland 
Conversion in the Northern Plains.” Economic Research Report 120, Economic Research 
Service, U.S Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C. 
20 
 
Collins, R. A. (1985). “Expected utility, debt-equity structure, and risk balancing.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 67(3), 627-629. 
de Mey, Y., et al. (2014). “Farm level evidence on risk balancing behavior in the EU-15.” 
Agricultural Finance Review, 74(1), 17-37. 
Dehejia, R. H., & Wahba, S. (2002). “Propensity score-matching methods for nonexperimental 
causal studies.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1), 151-161. 
Economic Research Service. (2014) “Historical U.S. and State-Level Farm Income and Wealth 
Statistics.” Available online at http://ers.usda.gov/data-products/farm-income-and-wealth-
statistics/historical-us-and-state-level-farm-income-and-wealth-statistics.aspx (accessed 
May 22 2014). 
Escalante, C. L. and Barry, P. J. (2003), "Determinants of the strength of strategic adjustments in 
farm capital structure.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 35(1): 67-78. 
Escalante, C.L., C.G. Turvey, and P.J. Barry, (2009) "Farm business decisions and the 
sustainable growth challenge paradigm", Agricultural Finance Review, 69(2), 228 – 247. 
Featherstone, A.M., Moss, C.B., Baker, T.G., & Preckel, P.V. (1988). “The theoretical effects of 
farm policies on optimal leverage and the probability of equity losses.” American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 70(3), 572-579. 
Gabriel, S.C., & Baker, C.B. (1980). “Concepts of business and financial risk.” American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 62(3), 560-564. 
Glauber, J. W. (2013). “The Growth of The Federal Crop Insurance Program, 1990–
2011.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 95(2), 482-488. 
21 
 
Gilligan, D. and J. Hoddinott (2007) “Is There Persistence in the Impact of Emergency Food Aid? 
Evidence on Consumption, Food Security, and Assets in Rural Ethiopia” American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 89: 225-242. 
Greene, W.H. (2003) Econometric Analysis, 5th Edition, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
Heimlich, R. (2000) “Farm Resource Regions” Agricultural Information Bulletin Number 760. 
USDA Economic Research Service, Washington DC, Available at: 
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib760 (Accessed 1 July, 2013). 
Henderson, J. & Akers, M. (2012). “Farmland values rise with crop prices.” Survey of 10th District 
Agricultural Credit Conditions, 1st Quarter, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
Ifft, J., Nickerson, C., Kuethe, T., & You, C. (2012). “Potential Farm-Level Effects of Eliminating 
Direct Payments.” USDA-ERS Economic Information Bulletin, (103). USDA-ERS 
Economic Information Bulletin, (103). 
Ifft, J., Novini, A., & Patrick, K. (2014). “Debt Use By US Farm Businesses.” USDA-ERS 
Economic Information Bulletin, (103). USDA-ERS Economic Information Bulletin, (122). 
Ifft, J.,  Kuethe, T. & Morehart, M. (2013). “Farm Debt Use by Farms with Crop Insurance.” 
Choices, 3rd Quarter. 
Ifft, J., Wu, S. & Kuethe, T. (2014). “The Impact of Pasture Insurance on Farmland Values.” 
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, forthcoming.  
Katchova, A. (2010) “Agricultural Contracts and Alternative Marketing Options: A Matching 
Analysis” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 42: 261-276. 
Kropp, J. D., & Whitaker, J. B. (2011). “The impact of decoupled payments on the cost of 
operating capital.” Agricultural Finance Review, 71(1), 25-40. 
22 
 
Kuethe, T. H., & Morehart, M. (2012). “The profit impacts of risk management tool 
adoption.” Agricultural Finance Review, 72(1), 104-116. 
Kuethe, T. and M. Morehart (2012b) “The Agricultural Resource Management Survey: An 
Information System for Production Agriculture” Agricultural Finance Review 72 (2): 191-
200. 
Jensen, F. E. and Langemeier, L. N. (1996), "Optimal leverage with risk aversion: empirical 
evidence", Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. 56 No. 1, pp. 85-97.  
Just, R.E., L. Calvin, and J. Quiggin. 1999. “Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance: Actuarial and 
Asymmetric Information Incentives.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81: 
834–49. 
Lynch, L. and X. Liu (2007) “Impact of Designated Preservation Areas on Rate of Preservation 
and Rate of Conversion: Preliminary Evidence” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 89: 1205-1210. 
Manning, C. (2007) “Logistic Regression (with R).” Available at: 
http://nlp.stanford.edu/manning/courses/ling289/logistic.pdf (Accessed 22 Sept., 2014). 
Mishra, A.K. and H.S. El-Osta (2002) “Managing Risk in Agriculture Through Hedging and Crop 
Insurance: What Does a National Survey Reveal?” Agricultural Finance Review 62 (2): 
135-148. 
Moss, C. B., J.S. Shonkwiler, and S.A. Ford. (1990) "A risk endogenous model of aggregate 
agricultural debt." Agricultural Finance Review 50(1): 73-79. 
O'Donoghue, E.J., M.J. Roberts, and N. Key, 2009. "Did the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act 
Increase Farm Enterprise Diversification?" Journal of Agricultural Economics. 60(1): 80-
104. 
23 
 
Pederson, G. (1990). “Determinants of crop insurance protection at agricultural 
banks.” Agricultural Finance Review, 50, 16-25. 
Risk Management Agency (2014) “Summary of Business Reports and Data.” Available online at 
http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob.html (Accessed May 24, 2014). 
Rosenbaum, P. and D. Rubin (1983) “The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational 
Studies of Causal Effects” Biometrika 701: 41-55. 
Sherrick, B.J., P.J. Barry, P.N. Ellinger, and G.D Schnitkey. 2004. “Factors Influencing Farmers’ 
Crop Insurance Decisions”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86(1) :103-14 
Skees, J. R., & Nutt, P. J. (1988). “The Cost of Purchasing Crop Insurance: Examining the 
Sensitivity of Farm Financial Risk.” Agricultural Finance Review, 48, 37-48. 
Smith, A.J., & Todd, E.P. (2005). “Does matching overcome LaLonde's critique of 
nonexperimental estimators?” Journal of Econometrics, 125(1), 305-353. 
Smith, V.H. and A.E. Baquet (1996) “The Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance: Evidence 
from Montana Wheat Farms” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78: 189-201. 
Turvey, C.G. (2012) “Whole Farm Income Insurance” The Journal of Risk and Insurance 79 (2): 
515-540. 
Turvey, C. G. and Kong, R. (2009), "Business and financial risks of small farm households in 
China", China Agricultural Economic Review, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 155-172.  
Velandia, M., R.M. Rejesus, T.O. Knight, and B.J. Sherrick (2009) “Factors Affecting Farmers’ 
Utilization of Agricultural Risk Management Tools: The Case of Crop Insurance, Forward 
Contracting, and Spreading Sales.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 41 (1): 
107-123. 
24 
 
Weber, J.G., & Clay, D.M. (2013). Who Does Not Respond to the Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey and Does It Matter?. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 95(3), 755-771. 
Westcott, P. C., & Young, C. E. (2004). “Farm program effects on agricultural production: coupled 
and decoupled programs.” Decoupled Payments in a Changing Policy Setting. United 
States Department of Agriculture—Economic Research Service, Agricultural Economic 
Report, (838), 7-17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
25 
 
Tables and Figures 
Figure 1: Mean farm debt by FCI participation ($Thousands), 2011 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Mean/Share 
of Farms Std. Err. 
 
 
Mean/Share 
of Farms Std. Err. 
Total farm financial debt 152,716.40 6,673.84  Southern Seaboard 0.11 * 
Non-real estate financial debt 29,399.86 4,861.87  Fruitful Rim 0.13 * 
Real estate financial debt 84,657.19 1,984.09  Basin and Range 0.04 * 
Short term financial debt (outstanding) 27,905.41 2,081.92  Mississippi Portal 0.03 * 
Short term financial debt (all) 79,236.08 4,337.97   
Farm business debt to asset ratio 0.09 0.01  Operator education 
Share of short term financial debt (all) 
to total operating expenses 0.20 0.01 
 
Some high school or less 0.09 * 
Current ratio 1.21 0.21  Completed high school 0.48 * 
FCI  0.28 0.01  Some college 0.24 * 
Acres 729.59 22.30  Completed college 0.19 * 
Percent cropland 0.54 0.01     
Ratio of owned to operated acres 0.92 0.03  Farm type   
Total off farm income 49,208.10 1,296.39  General cash grain 0.04 * 
Operator age 58.24 0.31  Wheat 0.02 * 
    Corn 0.12 * 
Sales class  Soybean 0.04 * 
$500,000 or more 0.14 *  Grain sorghum 0.00 * 
$250,000 - $499,999 0.10 *  Rice 0.00 * 
$100,000 - $249,999 0.13 *  Tobacco 0.01 * 
$40,000 - $99,999 0.13 *  Cotton 0.01 * 
$20,000 - $39,999 0.07 * 
 
Peanut 0.00 * 
$10,000 - $19,999 0.08 *  Fruits and tree nuts 0.12 * 
$9,999 or less 0.35 *  Vegetables 0.05 * 
    Nursery and greenhouse 0.02 * 
ERS Farm Resource Region  General crop 0.03 * 
Heartland 0.24 *  Beef cattle 0.31 * 
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Northern Crescent 0.15 *  Hogs 0.01 * 
Northern Great Plains 0.05 *  Poultry 0.04 * 
Prairie Gateway 0.13 *  Dairy 0.06 * 
Eastern Uplands 0.11 *  General livestock 0.12 * 
 
*Standard errors not reported for share-of-farms measures; 13,629 observations; standard errors are calculated using the delete-a-group 
jackknife 
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Table 2: Logit Results: Impact of Farm Characteristics on Federal Crop Insurance 
Participation  
 Coeff. Std. Error 
Constant 0.387 0.677  
Acres (thousands) 0.010 0.020  
Percent cropland 1.532 0.362 *** 
Ratio of owned to operated 
acres -0.006 0.260  
Total off farm income 
(thousands) 0.000 0.001  
Operator age -0.005 0.007  
    
Operator education 
Completed high school 1.070 0.509 * 
Some college 1.254 0.563 * 
Completed college 0.903 0.570  
    
Sales class 
$250,000 - $499,999 -0.330 0.257  
$100,000 - $249,999 -1.170 0.192 *** 
$40,000 - $99,999 -1.382 0.248 *** 
$20,000 - $39,999 -2.577 0.414 *** 
$10,000 - $19,999 -2.835 0.368 *** 
$9,999 or less -3.481 0.709 *** 
    
Farm type 
Wheat 1.210 0.489 * 
Corn 0.176 0.273  
Soybeans -0.227 0.469  
Grain sorghum -0.712 11.825  
Rice -0.040 0.760  
Tobacco -0.848 1.462  
Cotton 0.275 0.799  
Peanut 1.652 0.809 * 
General crop -1.241 0.410 ** 
Fruits and tree nuts 0.189 0.524  
Vegetables -1.841 0.554 *** 
Nursery and greenhouse -3.467 0.709 *** 
Beef cattle -1.538 0.323 *** 
Hogs -1.546 0.560 ** 
Poultry -2.572 0.462 *** 
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Dairy -1.832 0.3359 *** 
General livestock -2.946 0.440 *** 
    
ERS Farm Resource Region 
Northern Crescent -1.130 0.309 *** 
Northern Great Plains 0.819 0.438  
Prairie Gateway 0.213 0.410  
Eastern Uplands -1.257 0.500 * 
Southern Seaboard -1.036 0.322 ** 
Fruitful Rim -1.884 0.404 *** 
Basin and Range -2.092 0.361 *** 
Mississippi Portal -0.978 0.634  
 
Residual deviance 0.515  
Observations 13,347  
Significant at *α ≤ 0.10, **α ≤ 0.05, ***α ≤ 0.01; standard errors are calculated using the delete-
a-group jackknife 
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Table 3: Average Treatment Effects: Impact of Federal Crop Insurance Participation on 
Debt Use 
 Estimate Std. Error 
Total farm financial debt 114,697 81,826  
Non-real estate financial debt 30,726 21,498  
Real estate financial debt 6,423 63,785  
Short term financial debt (outstanding) 63,964 23,883 ** 
Short term financial debt (all) 214,314 61,112 *** 
Farm business debt to asset ratio 0.03 0.01 ** 
Share of short term financial debt (all) to total 
operating expenses 
0.14 0.00 
*** 
Current ratio 0.41 0.59  
Significant at *α ≤ 0.10, **α ≤ 0.05, ***α ≤ 0.01 
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Table 4: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results 
 Absolute debt usage Relative debt usage 
 Real estate 
debt 
Non-real 
estate debt 
Short term 
debt 
Debt-to-
asset 
ratio 
Current 
ratio 
Short 
term debt 
to 
operating 
expenses 
FCI 
participation 
-1,381 
(16,953) 
15,668* 
(8,936) 
21,887* 
(12,177) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.736 
(0.482) 
0.132** 
(0.062) 
Constant 
335,675*** 
(75,991) 
117,059*** 
(42,170) 
120,958*** 
(45,254) 
0.349*** 
(0.037) 
0.734 
(1.900) 
0.611 
(0.126) 
Acres 
(thousands) 
4,625 
(7,684) 
2,257 
(3,243) 
5,563 
(10,460) 
-0.002 
(.002) 
0.013 
(0.091) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
Percent 
cropland 
10,610 
(17,645) 
6,685*** 
(6,085) 
7,911*** 
(6,033) 
0.007** 
(0.014) 
0.072 
(1.604) 
-0.001 
(0.037) 
Ratio of owned 
to operated 
acres 
7,214*** 
(2,072) 
1,798*** 
(1,237) 
-414.6*** 
(472.0) 
0.001*** 
(0.003) 
0.337 
(0.866) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
Total off farm 
income 
(thousands) 
158.80* 
(93.10) 
35.54 
(66.60) 
39.10 
(59.84) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
Operator age -1,363*** 
(433.84) 
-215.9 
(200.8) 
-321.6 
(184.5) 
-0.004 
(0.001) 
-
0.037** 
(0.019) 
0.024*** 
(0.001) 
Did not 
complete high 
school 
-8,064 
(21,832) 
-16,166** 
(10,302) 
-10,166** 
(6,003) 
0.003 
(0.018) 
1.199 
(0.842) 
-0.042 
 (0.030) 
Completed high 
school 
-14,154 
(8,834) 
-10,040 
(7,677) 
-7,997 
(4,807) 
-0.002 
(0.019) 
0.755* 
(0.454) 
-0.015  
(0.024) 
Some college 
-1,151 
(14,032) 
-1,644 
(7,126) 
-9,927 
(5,689) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
0.036 
(0.319) 
-0.050** 
 (0.021) 
Sales Class       
$500,000 or 
greater 
-199,100** 
(91,766) 
-84,052 
(47,460) 
-94,289* 
(45,855) 
-0.056** 
(0.017) 
-0.018 
(0.324) 
-0.072* 
(0.042) 
$250,000 - 
$499,999 
-218,220** 
(104,388) 
-107,612** 
(52,786) 
-116,606** 
(48,274) 
-
0.058*** 
(0.022) 
0.029 
(0.406) 
-0.171*** 
 (0.053) 
$100,000 - 
$249,999 
-
264,850*** 
(100,761) 
-111,126** 
(52,297) 
-120,332** 
(48,613) 
-
0.085*** 
(0.021) 
2.034 
(1.421) 
-0.229*** 
 (0.056) 
$40,000 - 
$99,999 
-249,335** 
(100,469) 
-115,148** 
(51,602) 
-123,218** 
(49,854) 
-
0.083*** 
(0.023) 
0.676 
(0.902) 
-0.229*** 
(0.069) 
$20,000 - 
$39,999 
-
277,171*** 
(96,384) 
-114,078** 
(50,164) 
-121,600** 
(49,190) 
-
0.107*** 
(0.027) 
2.335* 
(1.319) 
-0.266** 
 (0.107) 
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$10,000 - 
$19,999 
-
277,573*** 
(96,359) 
-
114,639*** 
(50,628) 
-
117,158*** 
(47,757) 
-
0.078*** 
(0.027) 
1.873 
(1.410) 
-0.071 
 (0.063) 
Farm Type       
General cash 
grain 
-12,468 
(31,140) 
-1,831 
(10,441) 
-4,950 
(15,127) 
-0.000 
(0.019) 
-1.308 
(0.841) 
0.035 
 (0.080) 
Wheat 
17,035 
(34,837) 
-4,920 
(10,890) 
13,887 
(20,737) 
0.020 
(0.019) 
1.045 
(0.957) 
-0.024 
 (0.038) 
Corn 
42,604 
(55,885) 
-2,536 
(11,608) 
4,808 
(15,987) 
0.034 
(0.026) 
-0.398 
(0.428) 
0.105** 
 (0.048) 
Soybeans 
-55,445 
(38,689) 
-7,582 
(17,372) 
-7,379 
(18,867) 
0.047 
(0.080) 
0.788 
(2.965) 
0.182 
 (0.206) 
Grain sorghum 
-82,146* 
(42,560) 
10,926 
(26,404) 
12,142 
(28,751) 
0.054 
(0.030) 
-0.752 
(1.084) 
-0.061 
 (0.106) 
Rice 
-21,806 
(33,409) 
-378.3 
(18,781) 
19,325 
(22,094) 
-0.076 
(0.036) 
-0.652 
(0.781) 
0.062 
 (0.061) 
Tobacco 
-80,711*** 
(23,284) 
-9,645 
(10,073) 
-5,855 
(17,881) 
0.032 
(0.046) 
-0.449 
(0.983) 
0.081* 
(0.046) 
Cotton 
-34,120 
(35,783) 
29,096*** 
(22,478) 
-14,520 
(15,465) 
-0.018 
(0.030) 
4.152 
(2.926) 
0.008 
 (0.116) 
Peanut 
9,655 
(24,663) 
11,442 
(8,745) 
17,687 
(19,427) 
-0.003 
(0.027) 
-0.859 
(1.066) 
0.038 
 (0.042) 
General crop 
68,892 
(46,277) 
343.5 
(9,919) 
13,623 
(15,418) 
0.033 
(0.033) 
-0.387 
(1.640) 
-0.008 
(0.108) 
Fruits and tree 
nuts 
9,755 
(27,789) 
35,182*** 
(28,926) 
52,905*** 
(46,298) 
0.093** 
(0.051) 
4.071 
(3.675) 
-0.062 
 (0.067) 
Vegetables 
-7,123 
(30,074) 
-991.6 
(11,913) 
12,665 
(20,208) 
0.032 
(0.038) 
3.992 
(5.321) 
0.078 
 (0.052) 
Nursery and 
greenhouse 
17,993 
(24,197) 
16,573 
(11,302) 
29,171 
(24,599) 
0.034 
(0.025) 
-0.621 
(0.769) 
-0.109** 
 (0.052) 
Beef cattle 
32,051 
(90044) 
14,344 
(31,256) 
-7,062 
(30,335) 
0.037 
(0.032) 
0.244 
(0.760) 
-0.080 
 (0.067) 
Hogs 
58,658** 
(25633) 
-22,573 
(19,428) 
-22,911 
(25,652) 
0.064*** 
(0.035) 
0.427 
(0.855) 
-0.180*** 
 (0.060) 
Poultry 
92,097 
(100897) 
56,938*** 
(46,835) 
8,137 
(29,963) 
0.043* 
(0.023) 
0.194 
(0.504) 
-0.014  
(0.068) 
Dairy 
18,838 
(27540) 
15,921** 
(12,881) 
20,217*** 
(21,656) 
-0.000 
(0.024) 
-1.138 
(0.990) 
-0.037  
(0.049) 
ERS Region       
Northern 
Crescent 
7,760 
(11373) 
-1,165 
(6,609) 
-4,825 
(5,073) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.237 
(0.574) 
0.118*** 
 (0.029) 
Northern Great 
Plains 
-8,809 
(21796) 
3,833 
(11,380) 
13,535* 
(17,137) 
0.033** 
(0.029) 
0.864 
(0.870) 
0.019 
 (0.053) 
Prairie 
Gateway 
29,873 
(22570) 
764.9 
(9,758) 
7,117 
(8,496) 
0.0307 
(0.013) 
1.976 
(1.657) 
-0.077** 
 (0.032) 
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Eastern 
Uplands 
17,314 
(12078) 
-4,953 
(8,754) 
-7,378 
(10,302) 
0.077*** 
(0.061) 
0.438 
(0.991) 
-0.091** 
 (0.039) 
Southern 
Seaboard 
-5,564 
(14128) 
218.4 
(6,666) 
-10,871 
(13,173) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
0.084 
(0896) 
-0.108*** 
(0.032) 
Fruitful Rim 
20,455 
(23134) 
4,994 
(12,748) 
3,485 
(11,467) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
1.683 
(1.712) 
-0.008 
(0.042) 
Basin and 
Range 
-5,475 
(15484) 
-6,266 
(10,376) 
-7,144 
(7,534) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
0.686 
(1.269) 
-0.064* 
 (0.036) 
Mississippi 
Portal 
-37,230 
(27358) 
-5,388 
(11,312) 
-16,095 
(16,504) 
0.008 
(0.021) 
0.287 
(1.112) 
-0.611*** 
(0.033) 
Observations 13,629 13,629 13,629 13,176 13,176 13,176 
Breusch-Pagan 
Test Statistic 48,700 48,700 48,700 16,971 16,971 16,971 
Note: Significant at *α ≤ 0.10, **α ≤ 0.05, ***α ≤ 0.01; Standard errors are calculated using 1000 
cluster bootstrap iterations and are robust to correlation in standard errors at the strata level.  
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